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This paper tests a two-part hypothesis: first, thatduring
the period between publication ofthe risk-based capital




and therefore, in effect, forced BHCs withTier1 and/or
leverage capital-to-assets ratios belowtheregulatory min-
ima to decrease loans outstanding more than did BHCs
deficientonlyin theirtotalcapitalratios. Empirical evi-
dencesupporting bothpartsofthehypothesis ispresented.
InDecember1992,pursuant totheBasleaccord, capital re-
quirements forbanks and bank holding companies (BHCs)
changed. Forthe firsttime, theminimum amountofcapital
thatabanking organization wasrequired to hold depended
on the riskiness of its asset portfolio as well as its size.
Various types of assets were assigned weights, according
to their perceived riskiness.with commercial loans receiv-
ing the highest weight and U.S. government securities
the lowest. Banks and BHCs were required to hold at least
4 percent of their risk-weighted assets in so-called Tier 1
capital and 8 percent of their risk-weighted assets in Tier
1 plus supplementary (Tier 2) capital, which includes, for
example, mandatory convertible debt and subordinated
debt. For BHCs, the bulk of Tier I capital wasrequired to
be common shareholders' equity plus retained earnings. In
addition to the new risk-based requirements, a new mini-
mum Tier 1capital-to-unweighted asset ratio of 4 percent
was established.
When the new capital requirements were first made
public in early 1989, some BHCs found themselves ~n a
potentially deficient position. In order to meet the van~us
new capital requirements by the December 1992deadhne,
they would have to increase capital and/or decrease risk-
weighted, or perhaps unweighted, assets. Some of the
BHCs deficient in Tier 1capital foundthattheywould have
to increase common shareholders' equity in particular or
decrease assets. However, it hasbeen well established that
for a variety of firm types, the announcement of the
intention to issue common stock tends to decrease a firm's
stock value. This paper finds that this type of effect also
existed forBHCs in the period followingpublication of the
new capital requirements. The paper then argues that,
given the presence of such an effect, BHCs deficient in
common equity had a significant incentive to meet the
capital requirements bydecreasing assetgrowthrather than
issuing new common stock.
The argument implies that BHCs deficient only in
supplementary capital did not decrease asset growth as
much. This is because, in contrast to the "constrained"
BHCs that had to issue common stock, these "uncon-
strained" but still deficient BHCs could redress their
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do not lead to negative wealth effects. Deficient but
unconstrained BHCs could therefore afford greater asset
growth. Ofparticularinterest inthiscontextisloangrowth,
given that much has been written about the effects of the
risk-based capital requirements on bank lending and that
commercial loans receive such a high risk weighting.
Therefore, I test the hypothesis that "constrained" BHCs
exhibited lower loan growth than unconstrained but defi-
cient BHCs during the two years prior to December 1992.
Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that constrained
BHC loan growth was statistically significantly lower,
even after controlling for the size of each BHC's capital
deficiency.
The remainder of the paper falls into five sections.
Section I reviews literature related to the wealth effects of
security issuance. Section II discusses the data and the
empirical methodology used for estimating the effects of
BHC announcements ofcommon stock and supplementary
capital securities issuances on common stockreturns. This
section also presents the empirical results of this estima-
tion. Section III discusses the implications of a negative
common stock wealth effect for common stock deficient
BHCs and presents comparative summary statistics for
capital sufficient and constrained and unconstrained capi-
tal deficient BHCs. Section IV presents the data, meth-
odology,and results foraregression testingthe effectofthe
Tier 1 capital requirements on constrained BHC loan
growth. Section V concludes.
I. THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF
SECURITY ISSUANCE: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, I review the literature related to the wealth
effects of security issuance. Included will be a discussion
ofvarious theories explaining why common stockissuance
may lower common stock returns. This section will serve
as conceptual background for the empirical estimation of
the wealth effects of BHC security issuances and for the
ensuing discussion of the interaction between negative
wealth effects, capital requirements, and loan growth.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that, in the absence
of tax effects, information asymmetries, or other distor-
tions, the value of a firm should be independent of its
capital structure and therefore unaffected by the issuance
of new debt or equity. However,in the real world there are
tax effects and information asymmetries. Accordingly,
severalresearchers, including Asquith and Mullins (1986),
Smith (1986), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986), have
foundempirical evidence that a firm's stockprice typically
fallsupon theannouncement ofupcoming issuancesofnew
common stock. In addition, economists have found that
some, but not all, non-common stock security types also
show statistically significant effects-some negative and
some positive.
Miller and Rock (1985) attribute these results to infor-
mation asymmetries. Specifically, they hypothesize that
the market concludes that a firm that is seeking external
financing must be expecting lower earnings. The reason is
that, in the presence of information asymmetries, inside
financing (e.g., increased retainedearnings) usually would
be less expensive. However, Millerand Rock's theory does
not explain why announcements of issuances of different
types of securities would havedifferent effects.
Myers and Majluf (1984) offer a possible explanation.
They argue that managers havean incentive to issue equity
when the firm's stock isovervaluedand debt when its stock
is undervalued. This isbecause when afirmissuesequity,it
sells a portion of its existing assets but acquires, for its
existing stockholders, a sharein the netpresent valueofthe
new project to be undertaken. Ifthe firm's existing assets
are significantly undervalued by the market, the dilution
suffered by existing stockholders can be greater than any
gains they receive from undertaking the new project, in
which case no new equity will be issued. However, the
project may be financed through debt, because the trade-
off for existing stockholders between losing share in exist-
ing assets but gaining a share of the new project will be
more favorableifdebt isissued. On theotherhand, as stock
becomes overvalued, financing a new project through
stock issuance rather than debt issuance begins to look
more favorable to existing stockholders. Therefore, the
choice between raising fundsthrough equity ordebt will be
more likely to favor equity when the stock is overvalued
and more likely to favor debt when the stock is under-
valued. Ifthere is information asymmetry such that man-
agers have inside information regarding the value of the
firmthat market participants do nothave,then the issuance
of equity will impart new information to the market. In
particular, investors, knowing managers' incentives, will
interpret the issuance of new equity as a signal that the
stock is overvalued, and the price will fall.
Therefore, a synthesis of the Miller and Rockand Myers
and Majluf theories would say that equity issuance an-
nouncements shouldhavenegative effects, while debt issu-
ance announcements should have less negative or maybe
even positive effects on common stock returns.
The first part of this paper's thesis is that, during the
period after publication of the risk-based capital standards
in early 1989, BHC's common stock issuance announce-
ments created negative wealth effects. (Again, the second32 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1994,NUMBER 2
partis that the wealth effect combined with the risk-based
capitalrequirements to discourage common stock issuance
andencourage loan growth cutbacks among certainunder-
capitalized BHCs.) Wansley and Dhillon (1989), Keeley
(1989),Polonchek, Slovin, and Sushka (1989), Wall and
Peterson (1991), and Cornett and Tehranian (1994)all have
investigated the existence of negative wealth effects for
BHCs. At least for some subset ofBHCs, all found statisti-
callysignificantnegative abnormal returns associated with
commonstockissuance. Although the time periodforthese
studies differed from thetime period used in this paper, itis
important to review these studies' results.
Wansleyand Dhillon examine the stock market response
to public security offerings by BHCs between 1978 and
1985. Using an event study methodology,theyfind a statis-
tically significant decrease in common stock prices at the
time of the announcement of an upcoming common stock
issue.
Keeley investigates the period from 1975 to 1986 in
addition to two subperiods-January 1, 1975 through No-
vember30, 1981,and December 1,1981 through December
31,1986. Thetwoperiods are distinguished bythe imposi-
tion of specific objective capital requirements in 1981.
(Prior to 1981,capital requirements were more subjective
and nebulous.)
Forthe whole period, Keeleyfindsa statistically signifi-
cantnegative announcement effectforcommon stock and a
statistically significant positive effect for perpetual pre-
ferred stock. He also findsstatistically significant negative
effects for debt and common stock together in the earlier
period and for mandatory convertible debt in the later pe-
riodand a significantpositive effect forperpetualpreferred
stock in the later period. 1
In addition, Keeley findsa statistically significant nega-
tive announcement effect for common stock in the earlier
period, but not in the later period. However,when he con-
fines his sample to BHCs he classifies as capital deficient,
he finds statistically significant negative common stock
effects for both periods. In contrast, he finds a statistically
significant negative effect for his capital sufficient subset
in the earlier period only. Therefore, it appears that the
difference in the results for the two periods forthe group as
a whole largely is driven by a difference in the results for
the capital sufficient BHCs.
In explaining his results, Keeley entertains three hy-
potheses. First, he rejects thehypothesis that the difference
1. Actually, Keeley has no observations for perpetual preferred stock or
mandatory convertible debt for the earlier period and no observations
for simultaneous debt and common stock announcements for the later
period.
in the results across periods forthe entire sample is due to a
Myers and Majlufsignaling effect. It is logical to suppose
that the institution of objective capital standards made
equity offerings more predictableand therefore diminished
their information content. However, Keeley argues, this
also would imply that capital deficient BHCs would ex-
hibit less negative common stock issuance wealth effects
than capital sufficient BHCs, whose issuances should be
more voluntary. But, as he shows, this is not the case. In
both the earlier and later periods capital deficient BHCs
showed more negative wealth effects, and the difference
betweenthe effects for the two groups of BHCs was statis-
tically significant.
Keeley then suggests that the results for the two types of
BHCs differ because common stock issuance diminishes
the value of banks' deposit insurance guarantee. This is
especially true for banks with relatively low capital-to-
asset ratios.? However, this explanation is somewhat un-
satisfactory in that it does not adequately explain the
difference in results across time periods forthe sample as a
whole and for the capital sufficient BHCs.
Moreover, the deposit insurance hypothesis implies that
there should be a negative relationship between the in-
crease in the capital-to-assets ratio and the announcement
effect; a larger common stock issuance (relative to assets)
should be associated with a more negative announcement
effect. Keeley's results only weakly supportthis inference:
He finds the implied negative relationship for the capital
deficient BHCs only in the later period, and eventhen it is
not statistically significant.
Keeley's third explanationis the most satisfactory.Here,
he suggests that the issuance of common stock reveals
private informationheld byregulators. As Keeleyexplains,
market participants can tell whena BHC maybeunder reg-
ulatory pressureto increaseits capital ratio bylooking at its
balance sheet. However, the market does not necessarily
know the future prospects of the BHC or the method the
.BHC will use to augment capital.
Therefore, investors may view common stock issuance
bycapitaldeficientBHCs asasignthat theBHCs are under
regulatory pressure not to issue securities that require
increased payouts from earnings, such as debt or preferred
stock; thus, Keeley suggests, it also may be a signal of
management and regulator skepticism about theBHC's
ability to generate sufficient future earnings to meet the
cash flow requirements of additional debt or preferred
stock or to generate cash flow sufficient to permit the
accumulation of retained earnings to meet the new capi-
tal requirements. On the other hand, if regulators and
2. See Furlong and Keeley (1987 and 1989).LADERMAN/ BANK HOLDING COMPANY SECURITIES ISSUANCE 33
bank management believe that the BHC's future earnings
prospects are very good, retained earnings rather than a
security issuance can be used to meet higher capital
requirements. Moreover, he says, this explains why com-
mon stock issuance by a capital sufficient BHC might not
provide a negative signal.
The inside information hypothesis provides a plausible
explanation for all of Keeley's major findings concerning
common stock issuance. First, it can explain thedifference
between common stock announcement effects forhis capi-
tal deficient and capital sufficient subsets. Second, it
can explain the difference between announcement effects
for his capital sufficient subset in the earlier and later
periods. As Keeley says, prior to the institution of spe-
cific minimum capital requirements, market participants
might have been unsure whethera BHC's common stock
issuance were due to regulatory pressure. Since there
was some chance that it was, there was a small mean
negative announcement effect even for capital sufficient
organizations. However, he explains, after specific capital
requirements were introduced, market participants could
be confident that a common stock issue by a capital suf-
ficient BHC was nota signal that regulators viewed the
firm's earning prospects unfavorably. Therefore, common
stock issuance announcements no longer lowered stock
prices for this group. Third, the insider information hy-
pothesis also provides a plausible explanation for the
difference between the earlier and later period results for
his capital sufficient subset as well as for the full sample.
Polonchek, Slovin, and Sushka's results basically are
consistent with Keeley's results. These authors alsoexam-
ine apre-1981 period (January1975to November1981) and
a post-1981period (December 1981 to December 1984),as
wellas anaggregated1975to 1984period. Theyfindstatis-
tically significant negative common stock announcement
effects only for the earlier period by itself.
Wall and Peterson examine the announcementeffects of
BHC's securities issuances between 1982and 1986.These
authors improve onprior studies byusing informationfrom
the Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW) rather than the Wall
Street Journal (WSJ) to identify announcement dates. The
news wire is a more accurate source of when the market
first gets the news of an impending securities issue, which
maybe a day or more.before the news appears in the WSJ.
Wall and Peterson also find that common stock announce-
ments have statistically significant negative effects on
common stock returns.
Finally, Cornett and Tehranian study the wealth effects
of BHC announcements of issuances of various types of
securities during the period June 1983 through December
1989. The imposition of specific capital requirements for
multinational BHCs, which had previously been exempted
from objective capital standards, marks the beginning of
theperiod. Also, the "acceptable" total capital-to-assetra-
tio (greater than the "minimum" total capital-to-asset
ratio) was increased from 6.5 percent to 7 percent in June
1983.
Cornett and Tehranian separate their sample into "vol-
untary" and "involuntary" issues of securities. They clas-
sify an issue as voluntary if the BHC's total capital ratio is
above 7 percent at the end of the year prior to the security
issue, involuntary if not. These authors find statistically
significant negative wealth effects for common stock for
the voluntary issues. Fortheinvoluntary issues, onetype of
statistical test indicates a statistically significant negative
effect, while a second type indicates a lack of statistical
significance. In addition, thenegative announcement effect
for the voluntary issuers is larger in absolute value than is
the estimated effect for involuntary issuers, and the dif-
ference between the effects for the two groups is statis-
tically significant. These results contrast with Keeley's
results regarding his capital deficient and capital sufficient
subsets; Keeley found significant negative effects for his
capital deficient BHCs, but not for the capital sufficient
BHCs. Cornett and Tehranian also found a statistically
significant positive announcement effect for involuntary
issues of straight (not convertible into common stock)
debt.
Cornett and Tehranian attribute their results to the
capital structure signaling model found in Ross (1977).
Similar in spirit toMyers and Majluf's later paper, Ross's
paper has managers possessing inside information about
the prospects forthefirmissuing equity whenprospects are
poor and debt when prospects are good. As Cornett and
Tehranian explain, this is because a firm with poor pros-
pects will want to share its downside with new claimants
and thus prefers financing via stock issuance, whereas a
firm with good prospects will not want to share its upside
with new claimants and thus prefers debt financing.
Investors recognize these incentives, and therefore the
stock price falls upon announcement of an impending vol-
untary equity issuance. However, Cornett and Tehranian
reason, equity issuances perceived by market participants
as involuntary need not necessarily imply poor prospects
and therefore need not depress stock returns.
Several methodological differences between Keeley's
and Cornett and Tehranian's approaches may help to
explain the differences in results. First, it is possible that
Cornettand Tehranian's sample of security issuances gives
a positive bias to their involuntary issuance results. In
contrast to Keeley, Cornett and Tehranian do not exclude
issuances that are not publicly announced. Instead, these
authors use the Securities and Exchange Commission
filing (registration) date as the announcement date for34 FRBSFECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 2
security issuances not located in the Wall StreetJournal
Index. It is likely that nonpublicly announced security
issuanceshavea weaker effect onthemarket than those that
are publicly announced. Because Cornett and Tehranian's
involuntaryissuers areon averagesmaller than their volun-
tary issuers, the involuntary issuers are less likely to
announce publicly.3 Therefore, ifcommon stock announce-
menteffects for all BHCs tend to be negative, Cornett and
Tehranian's methodology might havebiased the effects for
involuntary issues upward.
Another distinction between the two studies concerns
the definition of undercapitalized BHCs. Keeley's distinc-
tion between capital deficient and capital sufficient BHCs
depends on their capitalizationasofafixeddate, December
1981, and its status does not change over time. This means
that Keeley's classification of a security issuance an-
nouncement depends only on the identity of the announc-
ing BHC. In contrast, Cornettand Tehranian's designation
of involuntary versus voluntary issues depends on the
issuing BHC's capitalization at the end of the year before
the security offering. Therefore, their classification of
a security issuance announcement depends partially on
the identity of the issuer and partially on the timing
of the issue.
Because BHCs can change their capital-to-assets ratios
over time, Cornett and Tehranian's procedure seems more
intuitively appealing than Keeley's. Cornett and Tehran-
ian's method more likely correctly identifies security issu-
ance announcements byBHCs that had relatively lowlevels
ofcapital at the time of the announcement. It is somewhat
puzzling, however, that Cornett and Tehranian look at
BHC capitalization at the end of the year before the
security issuance rather than at the end of the year before
the security issuance announcement.
Keeleyand Cornettand Tehranian also use different cap-
ital ratios fortheir classifications. Keeleyuses a5.5 percent
primarycapitalratio cutoff, and Cornettand Tehranian use
a 7 percent total capital ratio cutoff." This may be an
important distinction, but it would not, a priori, tend to
yield the particular differences in results that we see.
3. The mean value of assets for BHCs issuing voluntarily was (in
millions) $38,289.6, and the median was $16,488.5, while the corre-
sponding figures for those issuing involuntarily were $29,809.6 and
$12,236.2.
4. In 1981,specific minimumprimary capital-to-total assets ratios were
set for BHCs based on their size. The minima were 6 percent for BHCs
with assets of $1 billion or less and 5 percent for BHCs over $1 billion.
The 171argest banking organizations, the multinationals, were treated
onan individualbasis. Also in 1981,theFederal Reserve set up "zones"
of adequacy for regional banking organizations, based on total capital-
to-assets ratios. An "acceptable" total capital-to-assets ratio was
Finally,as Cornettand Tehranianpointout, their sample
size is considerably larger than Keeley's. By itself, this
lends credence to Cornett and Tehranian's results. In
particular, it may explain why Keeley did not find a
statistically significant negative common stock announce-
ment effect for his capital sufficient BHCs in the post-1981
period, whereas Cornettand Tehraniandid.5 Also, neither
study mentions excluding security issuance announce-
ments contaminated by the concurrent announcement of
other important news, such as ratings changes or merger
agreements. Although not removing contaminated an-
nouncements would not, a priori, bias results in one
direction or the other, it might lead to spurious conclu-
sions. This would more likely be a problem with small
samples such as Keeley's.
II. ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS:
METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND RESULTS
Methodology
This section reexamines the effect of the announcement of
an upcoming issuance of securities on BHC stock returns.
Studies cited above did not estimate announcement effects
for theperiodof time relevant to this paper-afterpublica-
tion of the risk-basedcapital guidelines. Given the regula-
tory regime shift and the dependence of this paper's thesis
on the continued existence of a negative common stock
wealth effect, it is important to examine the post-1989
period in particular.
The announcement effect of a security issuance is the
change in the announcing firm's common stock return
resulting from the announcement, or the "abnormal re-
turn." To calculate abnormal returns, some estimate of
"normal" returns must be made. In this paper, I use the
market model to estimate normal, or expected, returns.
deemed to be 6.5 percent, and banking organizations in this zone were
subject to minimum regulatory supervision. The minimum was set at
5.5 percent.
In June 1983, the 6.5 percent cutoff for acceptable total capital was
increased to 7 percent, and the 5 percent primary capital requirement
wasextended to the multinationals. Cornettand Tehranian usethe7 per-
cent total capital requirement as their cutoff for involuntary issues.
In 1985, regulators introduced a minimum primary capital-to-assets
ratio of 5.5 percent and a minimumtotal capital-to-assetsratio of6per-
cent for all BHCs. Keeley argues that these 1985rules were the ultimate
goal as early as 1981,so he designates anyBHC with a primary capital
ratio in December 1981 of less than 5.5 percent as capital deficient.
5. Keeleyhad only fiveobservations in his post-1981sample ofcommon
stock issuance announcements by capital sufficient BHCs, whereas
Cornett and Tehranian had 61observations in their sample of voluntary
common stock issuances.LADERMAN/ BANK HOLDING COMPANY SECURITIES ISSUANCE 35
(4)
(3)
Under reasonable assumptions, it can then be shown
that the statistic
Although the risk-based capital requirements were not
fully implemented until the end of 1992, final guidelines
were issued in March 1989. Therefore, this data set covers
1989through 1992.7A list ofBHCsecurities issuances was
obtained from Securities Data Company (SDC). Most of
the issuances on the SDC data set include the SEC filing
date (registrationdate) forthe offering. Relativelyfewhave
missing filing dates. The SDCdata also include the se-
curity type, the date the securitywasoffered to the market,
and the dollar amount raised by the offering.
The filing date given on the SDC data set was used to
locate the announcement date on the DJNW. Usually, the
first announcement was on the day of or day after the filing
or, rarely, soon before the filing." Given the widespread
coverage offered by the DJNW, issuances for which no
DJNWannouncement could be located were assumed to be
not publicly announced and were omittedfrom the sample.
Security issuances that are filed as shelf registrations
also were omitted from the sample. A shelf registration
permits a firm to issue at any time in the future and is
therefore a weaker signal than a non-shelfregistration that
the firm intends to issue in the near future. (Common stock
issuances in the SDC data set were never filed as shelf
registrations, sothe omission ofshelfregistrations doesnot
affect prediction error estimates for common stock.)




ket model estimation period, andRm,jiis the mean market
return in the estimation period associated with bankjand
event i.
The "average standardized prediction error" for se-
curity type k, ASPEk , is defined as
1
ASPEk = K S SPE J'i •
ke{K}
7. To be included in the data set, the announcement had to be between
1989and 1992, inclusive, and the actual issuancehad totake place bythe
end of 1992.
8. The close on the New York Stock Exchange..the American Stock
Exchange, and NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations System for stock traded over-the-counter) is
at 4:00 p.m., Eastern time. Therefore, if the news came over the wire
after 4:00 p.m., the announcement date was taken to be the next trad-
ing day.
(7)
The average predictionerror indicates the size of the ab-
normal return. A test of the statistical significance of the
abnormal returnrequires a transformation ofthe prediction
error into the "standardized prediction error," defined as
PE..
SPEji = S.~I ,
JI
(Rm, ii - Rm,jJ 2 ).
120
1~1 (Rmt - R m,ji)2
In (5), lji is the residual variance from the market model
regression for bankjand event i, Rm,jiis the market return
oneventdaytji, Rmt is the market return on daytofthe mar-
(5) Sji =
6. I use post-event data in addition to pre-event data to estimate the
market model because the event itself may alter stock price volatility.
Under the market model,
(1) R jt = (Xj + J3j R mt + Ejt ,
where R jt is bankj'scommon stock return on dayt and R mt
is the market return on day t. I estimate the market model
for eachbank and for each announcement event for a 120-
day period. The first part of the estimation period begins
79 trading days before the security issuance announcement
and ends 20 days before it; the second part begins 20 days
after the announcement and ends 79 days after it.6 The
"announcementday" is defined as the day that news of the
planned issuance appears on the DJNW. The abnormal
return,or predictionerror,PEjiforbankjonannouncement
day tji, is then the difference between the actual return and
the predicted return allgiven by the market model
(2) PEji = R ji - (Xji + J3ji Rm,jJ
where R jiis bankj'scommon stockreturn on daytji, (Xjiand
J3j i are thecoefficients estimatedfromequation (1)forbank
j and announcement event i, and Rm,ji is the market return
on day tji'
I calculate an average prediction error for various secu-
rity types. The average prediction error simply adds to-
gether the prediction errors for events associated with. a
particular security type, and averages this sum across all
events (for all BHCs) of that type. Let {K} be the set of all
events associated with security type k, and let K be the
number of events of type k. Then the "average prediction
error" for security type k, APEk is defined as:
1
APEk = ("j() ke~} PEji .
where36 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 2
In addition, ifon theannouncementdaysignificantnews
other than the security issuance announcement appeared
(for example securities ratings changes, unexpected
changes in earnings or loan loss provisions, and merger
announcements), that observation was dropped from the
sample. Finally, initial public offerings and secondary
offerings of securities were omitted.
Common stock returns for estimation of the prediction
errors were obtained from two sources. Returns for BHCs
whose stocktrades ontheNewYorkStockExchange orthe
American Stock Exchange were obtained from the Center
for Research in Securities Prices. Those for BHCs whose
stock trades over the counter were calculated using stock
prices obtained from Data Resources, Incorporated. The
market return used in estimation of the market model was
the return on a broad-based index, the Wilshire 5000
Index.
Results
Average prediction errors and their associated Z statistics
were calculatedforcommon stock, subordinated debt, and
preferred stock. I also calculated prediction errors for two
subcategories of preferred stock: auction-rate preferred
stock and non-auction-rate preferred stock. Therisk-based
capital requirements state that common stock and non-
auction-rate perpetual preferred stock count as Tier 1
capital for BHCs, while subordinated debt and auction-
rate perpetual preferred stock count as supplementary
capital.
Mandatory convertible debt and term preferred stock
also count as secondary capital. However, neither the SDC
data set nor the DJNW specified whether debt issuances
were mandatory convertible or not, nor whether preferred
stock was perpetual or term. Therefore, no prediction
errors are provided for mandatory convertible debt. Also,
all preferred stock was assumed to be perpetual (and,
unless otherwise notedbySDC ortheDJNW, wasassumed
to be non-auction-rate). Table 1 shows the number of
securities issuance announcements in the sample, by year
of announcement and type of security.
Table 2 contains the average prediction errors and their
associated Z statistics for the various security types listed
in Table1.The results in Table2 indicate that, on average,
there are significant negative abnormal returns associated
with the issuance of common stock. On average, the an-
nouncement of an impending issuance of new common
stock decreases common stockreturns relative totheirpre-
dicted values by approximately 1.6 percentage points.
Abnormal returns due to the announcementofthe issuance
of other types of securities are not statistically significant.
The magnitude of the announcement effect found for
TABLE 1
SECURITIES ISSUEsa
SECURITY TYPE 1989 1990 1991 1992 Au, YEARS
CommonStock 7 1 16 20 44
SubordinatedDebt 1 1 2 2 6
PreferredStock 3 2 7 7 19
Auction-Rate 3 0 1 1 5




AVERAGE PREDICTION ERRORS (APE)
1989-1992a
SECURITY TYPE APE Z PERCENT NEGATIVEb
(SAMPLE SIZE)
CommonStock -.0155* -4.17 77.3c (44)
Subordinated Debt .0012 -.11 66.7 (6)
PreferredStock .00009 .009 63.2 (19)
Auction-Rate .005 .35 60.0 (5)
Nonauction-Rate -.0016 -.2 78.6 (14)
-Prediction errors are actual residual returns, not percentage point
residualreturns.
bThe nullhypothesis isthattheproportionofnegativepredictionerrors
equals0.5. I use the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test describedby Daniel
(1978).
-Signed-ranks testis significant at the I percentlevel.
*Significantly differentfrom0 at the I percentlevel.
common stockis remarkably similarto thosefoundbypre-
vious researchers. Wansley and Dhillon found a two-day
announcement effectforcommon stock of-1.5 percentage
points; Keeley found the same for his entire sample;
Polonchek, et al., found a three-day announcement effect
of -1.4 percentage points; and Wall and Peterson found a
one-day announcement effect of -1.5 percentage points.
However, as discussed in the literature reviewin Section
I, Cornett and Tehranian's results cast some doubt on the
existence of a negative common stock wealth effect for
relatively low-capital banking organizations. Therefore,
given the focus of this paper, it is important to test for the
existence of a negative common stock wealth effect for
low-capital banks. I looked at BHCs' capital positions inLADERMAN/ BANK HOLDING COMPANY SECURITIES ISSUANCE 37
December 1990(the first date for which risk-based capital
figures were available) and chose those that had to issue
common stock to meet the well-capitalized risk-based
capital guidelines." There were ten common stock issu-
ance announcements by such BHCs in 1991 and 1992.The
average prediction error for this group wasestimated to be
-2.74 percentage points, which was statistically signifi-
cant at the 1percent level. In addition, nine out of the ten
prediction errors were negative.
m. THEEFFECT ON CAPITALDEFICIENTBHCs
BHCs that were capital deficient when the risk-based
capital rules were published had to redress the situationor
face tight regulatory supervision and perhaps closure.Itis
reasonable to suppose that capital deficient BHCs would
not havechosen to meet the guidelines exclusivelybyissu-
ing common stock given its negative wealth effect. For
some BHCs, the alternatives to issuing common stock
included decreasing assets and issuing other types of
securities that, as shown in the last section, appear not to
havenegative wealth effects. I willrefer to deficientBHCs
with such options simply as "unconstrained" BHCs. For
other deficient BHCs, the only alternative to issuing com-
mon stock was to decrease assets. I will refer to these
BHCs as "constrained" BHCs. BHCs thatmeettheguide-
lines will be called "unaffected" BHCs.
Given their lack of attractive options, it is likely that,
following the publication of the risk-based capital guide-
lines, constrained BHCs decreased assets more than did
unconstrained BHCs. Whether this is in factthe case must
be ascertained empirically. The first step in this exerciseis
to identify properly constrained and unconstrained BHCs,
which depends on an understanding of the risk-based
capital rules.
The calculation of Tier 1 capital for BHCs sums com-
mon shareholders' equity (including retained earnings),
non-auction-rate perpetual preferred stock, up to a cer-
tain limit, and minority interests in equity accountsofcon-
solidated subsidiaries. The rules then deduct "goodwill"
and50 percent of investments in unconsolidated bank-
ing and finance subsidiaries from this sum to obtainTier 1
capital.'? Non-auction-rate perpetual preferred stock is
9. Tobe considered well-capitalizedunder the risk-based capital rules,
a BHC has to hold Tier 1 capital equal to at least 6 percent of risk-
weighted assets. Total capital is required to be at least 10 percent of
risk-weighted assets, and, under the leverage ratio requirement, Tier 1
capital must be at least 5 percent of unweighted assets.
10. Goodwill is an intangible asset that is entered on the books of a
banking organization when it pays more than book value to acquire
assets.
limited to 25 percent of Tier 1 capital exclusive of the
deductions.
The calculation of supplementary (Tier 2) capital for
BHCs sums allowancefor loan and lease losses, perpetual
preferred stock not eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capi-
tal (including auction-rate perpetual preferred), hybrid
capital instruments (e.g., mandatory convertible debt and
perpetual debt), term subordinated debt, andintermediate-
term preferred stock. Then, the other 50 percent of invest-
ments in unconsolidated subsidiaries is deducted. Finally,
therules setTier2capital equalto this net amount orTier1
capital, whichever is greater.
Totalcapital is the sum of Tier 1capital plus Tier2 cap-
ital minus reciprocal holdings ofotherdepositories' capital
securities. The risk-based capital rules specifyminima for
three capital ratios. Stated differently,therules requirethat
different types of capital be equal to at least a certain
percentage of risk-weighted or unweighted assets. Tier 1
capital is required to be equal to at least 4 percent of risk-
weighted assets. Total capital is required to be at least 8
percent of risk-weighted assets. The "leverage ratio"
requirement is that Tier 1 capital plus 50 percent of
investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries be at least 4
percent of total tangible assets, not risk-weighted.
Although the risk-based capital requirements were first
made public in early 1989, Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital,
and risk-weighted assets figureswerenotall availableuntil
December 1990. Therefore, categorization of BHCs into
capitalization groups is based on year-end1990data rather
than early 1989data. Capital ratio elements were obtained
from the Consolidated Financial Statements for BHCs for
all 1,119 BHCs reporting risk-weighted assets figures in
December 1990.
Constrained BHCs were identified as those BHCs that
did not meet the Tier 1 requirement, the leverage ratio
requirement, or both, in December 1990,and wouldnotbe
expected to meet them by the end of 1992, taking into
account projected growth in retained earnings. 11The risk-
based rules required full compliance bythe end of1992.In
devising a strategy to meet the guidelines by that time,
capital deficient BHCs likely took into account probable
growth in retained earnings. I assume that, at the end of
1990, BHCs projected that retained earnings growth dur-
ing 1991 and 1992 would be the same as during 1989.
Therefore, the group of constrained BHCs excludes those
that would have been predicted to meet the Tier 1 and
11.This group was filtered to remove those BHCs that might have met
the Tier 1 and leverage ratio minima simply by issuing nonauction-rate
perpetual preferred stock, taking into account the limit on the use of
this type of security forTier 1purposes. However,noBHCsfell into this
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leveragecapital ratio minima by the end of 1992simply
through sustainedretainedearningsgrowth.Of 82 BHCs
that failed to meet the Tier 1 ratio, the leverage ratio, or
both, in December1990,15 wereexcludedbythismeans,
leaving 67 constrainedBHCs.
UnconstrainedBHCsweredefinedto be thosethatmet
the Tier 1andleverageratio minima(orwereprojectedto
byyear-end 1992), butnotthetotalratiominimum,inDe-
cember 1990. UnaffectedBHCs weredefinedto be those
that met all three capitalratio minimain December 1990.
Table3givesvariousdescriptive statisticsforthesubset
of each ofthethree groupsofBHCsthatreportedloansin
both December1990 and December 1992. Of particular
interest is total loan growth between year-end 1990 and
year-end1992, the deadline for full compliance with the
risk-based capital requirements. Becauseof the relatively
high weightinggiven to loans in the calculationof risk-
weightedassets,BHCswithinadequateTier1ortotalcapi-
talratioswhochosetoremedy thesituationwithadecrease
in assetswouldhave hada particularlystrongincentive to
decreaseloans.Commercialbusiness,commercial reales-
tate,andconsumerloansreceive a100percentweightinthe
calculation of risk-based capital. Residential mortgages
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 997BHCs REPORTING
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS IN DECEMBER 1990 AND
LoANS IN DECEMBER 1990 AND DECEMBER 1992
ASSETSa RISK- TOTAL loAN
(MILLIONS) WEIGHTED GROWTHc
ASSETSb
Unaffected BHCs(n = 906)
Mean $2,616.7 $2,603 10.28%
Minimum $140.9 $18.2 -82.29%
Maximum $110,728 $104,116.3 293.54%
Unconstrained BHCs(n = 52)
Mean $3,107.7 $2,815.1 11.54%
Minimum $155.2 $79.8 -41.99%
Maximum $45,389.9 $48,771.7 316.77%
ConstrainedBHCs(n = 39)
Mean $7,289.3 $7,604.3 -12.64%
Minimum $152.7 $54.4 -84.16%
Maximum $216,986 $245,556.6 173.72%
SOURCE: Consolidated Financial Statements forBHCs.
aBook valueof unweighted assetsin December 1990.
bBook valueofrisk-weighted assetsin December 1990.
<December 1990to December 1992.
receivea50percentweight.U.S. governmentsecuritiesre-
ceiveazeroweight.BHCswithinadequateleverage ratios
mayalso havechosen to decreaseloans.
As can be seen from Table 3, the mean asset size of
constrained BHCs was larger than the mean asset sizes
of unconstrainedand unaffectedBHCs. Moreimportant,
average loan growth for the constrainedBHC group was
considerably lower than for the unconstrained group. In
addition, average growthforthe unconstrained groupwas
comparabletothatforunaffectedBHCs.Thissuggests that
decreasing loans, although an option for unconstrained
BHCs, wasavoided as muchas possibleand waspursued
onlybythe constrainedBHCs. However, this resultis not
conclusive because it does not control for the extent of
capital deficiency in the unconstrained and constrained
groups,norforchanges inloandemand,bothofwhichmay
influence loangrowth.I willcontrolforthesefactors when
I compare loan growth for these two groups in the next
section.
Table4 comparesthe incidenceof commonstockissu-
ance and the amounts raised through common stock is-
suancefor the three groupsof BHCs.
Giventhenegativewealtheffectsofcommonstockissu-
ance, the incidenceof commonstockissuanceseenforall
three groupsin Table4 seemssurprisingly high.12 Appar-
ently, despiteitsnegativewealtheffects,someBHCshave
goodreasonsto wantto issuecommonstock.Anexample
might be issuing commonstockfor acquisition purposes.
However, by itself, "having" to issue common stock to
avoida decreasein assetsapparentlywasnota verygood
reason. All other things equal, one wouldhave expected
thatthe issuancerate forconstrainedBHCs, whichhadto
issue common stockor decreaseassets, wouldhave been
higher than for unconstrained or unaffected BHCs. How-
ever, the negativewealtheffectseemsto have been strong
enoughthatconstrainedBHCswerenotespeciallylikelyto
issue common stock. As shown in Table4, constrained
BHCs were no more likely to have been common stock
issuers than unconstrained BHCs and only slightlymore
likely than unaffected BHCs, althoughthey did seem to
raise somewhat larger amounts whentheydid issue.
12.TheConsolidatedFinancialStatementsdatasetcoversamuchwider
universeofcommonstockissuersthandoestheSDCdataset, butithas
no information on filing datesor announcement dates. Onlythe larger
BHCswithpubliclytradedsecurities arereportedontheSDCdataset.
For 1991 and 1992, SDC reported 53 BHC common stock issuers,
whereasthe Consolidated Financial Statements reported424 issuers.LADERMAN/ BANK HOLDING COMPANY SECURITIES ISSUANCE 39
TABLE 4
COMMON STOCK ISSUANCES BY SAMPLE BHCs
DECEMBER 1990-DECEMBER 1992
SOURCE: Consolidated Financial Statements forBHCs.
"Amount raisedas a percentof risk-weighted assetsin December
1990. Statisticsarebasedon issuingBHCsonly.
IV: THE EFFECT OF THE TIER 1
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS ON
CONSTRAINED BHC loAN GROWTH
14. Furlong (1993) argues that, for many capital deficient BHCs,
becoming well-capitalized, not just adequately capitalized, was the
goal. Furlong examines changes in capital and risk-based assets be-
tweenDecember 1990and December 1992.Official requirements for
beingconsidered well-capitalized werenotpublished untilJune1992.
However, it is reasonable to assume that these rules just codified
unwritten rules already well-understood by BHCs. Therefore, it is
reasonable to arguethatmanyBHCsthatdidnotmeetwell-capitalized
guidelines in December 1990 intendedto do so by December 1992.
However, usingthecapitalshortfall belowtheminimum ratherthanthe
well-capitalized level isconsistent withtheBHCgroupdefinitions and,
intheregression, merely changes therelative sizesofthecoefficients on
theconstantandtheshortfall variable.
15. Strictlyspeaking,given a targetratio, the increasein capitaland
decreaseinassetschosentoachieve thegoalwilldependontheshortfall
and theinitiallevels ofcapitalandassets.However, wheninitiallevels
forcapitalandassetswereincludedintheregression, theircoefficients
werenotstatistically significant.
shortfall. This is the maximum of the three differences
between the three required minimum levels and the three
corresponding actual ratios in December 1990.
For unconstrained BHCs, the maximum capital ratio
shortfall is the percentage point difference between the
total capital ratio minimum and the actual total capital
ratio. For constrained BHCs, it is the difference between
the total capital ratio minimum and the actual total capital
ratio, or the difference between the leverage ratio mini-
mum and the actual leverageratio, whicheveris greater. In
making loan growth a function of the capital shortfall
below the minimum, I assume that the minimum is the
target for most BHCs.14 In addition, I control for the
possibility thatlowerloangrowthbytheconstrained BHCs
is simply the result of a greater capital deficiency,however
capital is defined, and is not the result of a deficiency in
common equity in particular.P
To control for changes in loan demand, the regression
also includes economic growth in the BHCs' subsidiaries'
states. This is the weighted average personal income
growth between December 1990 and December 1992, in
percent, in the BHC's subsidiary banks' states, weighted
by the share of total BHC assets held by the BHC's
subsidiaries in that state. I expect that there is a positive
relationship between economic growth and loan growth.
Aconstantis includedtohelpcapture the effectsofother
influences on loan growth not stemming from the need to
achieve regulatory capital minima. BHCs that reported
loans in December 1990 but not in December 1992 are
omitted from the regression. A dummy variable indicates
whether or not the BHC is constrained or unconstrained.
Themodelwasestimated usingordinaryleast squaresre-
























(24 outof 52, or 46.15%)
Constrained BHCs
(18outof 39, or 46.15%)
In this section, I investigate whether the differenceshown
in Table 3 between constrained and unconstrained BHC
loangrowthis statistically significant, controllingforother
factorslikelyto affect loan growth. I will test thehypothe-
sis that constrained BHC loan growth between year-end
1990 andyear-end1992wasstatistically significantlymore
negative than unconstrained BHC loan growth over the
same period.
Given the results in Section Il, I will assume that
negativecommon stockwealtheffectsapplytoconstrained
BHCs.13 Thesimpleregression thatI willestimatehasloan
growth as a function of the BHC's maximum capital ratio
13.Theidealapproachwouldbe toestimatecommonstockannounce-
menteffects forconstrained BHCsfor1991 and1992.(Announcements
during1991 and1992arerelevant becausethedependent variable inthe
regression willbeloangrowthbetweenDecember 1990 andDecember
1992.)Unfortunately, the samplesize wasinsufficient to permit such
estimation. There were four commonstockissuance announcements
betweenDecember 1990andDecember1992byconstrainedBHCs.Se-
curitiesDatareportednofiling datesforthreeofthese, andtherefore no
announcement dates were located. The remaining announcement, by
RiggsNational Corporation, resultedina 1.11 percentage pointdropin
thereturn on commonstock. Therefore, resultsforconstrained BHCs
were proxiedby the announcement effectsreportedin Section IT for
BHCsthathad to issuecommonstock(ordecreaseassets)tomeetthe






The resultsin Table 5 supportthe hypothesis thatcon-
strained BHCs had statistically significantly lower loan
growth over the 1991-1992 period than unconstrained
BHCs, evencontrolling fordifferences inloandemandand
general capital deficiency. The results indicate that, on
average and with otherfactors heldconstant,loangrowth
at BHCs that were constrained either to issue common
stockortodecreaseassetswasabout28percentagepoints
lowerthanloangrowthatBHCsthatcouldreachthemin-
imum by issuingothertypes of capital instruments. This
difference is comparable to, but somewhat larger than,
thedifference inmeanloangrowthbetweenthetwogroups





LoAN GROWTH BETWEEN DECEMBER 1990 AND DECEMBER
1992 FOR 75 CONSTRAINED AND UNCONSTRAINED
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE COEFFICIENT t RATIO
Constant -48.878** -2.046
Capital Ratio Shortfall -2.83* -1.865
Economic Growth in
BHC Subsidiary States 7.157*** 2.867
Constrained -28.103*** -2.708
AdjustedR2 = .164
*Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
**Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
***Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
16. The number is less than the sum of unconstrained and constrained
BHCs indicated in Table 3 (91).The BHCs excluded are ones for which
V. CONCLUSION
This paper tests a two-part hypothesis. FIrst, during the
period between publicationof the risk-based capital re-
quirements inearly1989 andtheendof1992,BHCsfaced
a statistically significant decrease in stock returns-a
negative shareholder wealth effect-if they issued new
common stock. Second, this negative wealtheffect dis-
couraged new common stock issuance and therefore in
effectforced BHCsdeficientincommonstocktodecrease
loans outstanding more than did BHCs deficient in other
typesofcapital.Empiricalevidence supporting bothparts
of the hypothesis waspresented.
Oneinterpretation of theresultspresentedinthispaper
is that, had the risk-based capital rules not included a





shareholders' equity. Thistypeofcapitalarguably provides
thebestprotectiontothedepositinsurance fundincaseof
bank failure. However, it does mean that if we are con-




the required information on bank subsidiary .location could not be
located (including foreign BHCs), BHCs with no commercial bank
subsidiaries, and individuals or pseudo BHCs.LADERMAN/ BANK HOLDING COMPANY SECURITIES ISSUANCE 41
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